Collaborators/funders: Systems and Software Security / FM Research Group ARM Centre of Excellence PPGEE, PPGI – UFAM Centre for Digital Trust and Society UKRI, EPSRC, EU Horizon and industrial partners



The University of Manchester

An Exploration of Automated Software Testing, Verification, and Repair using ESBMC and ChatGPT




Lucas Cordeiro

lucas.cordeiro@manchester.ac.uk https://ssvlab.github.io/lucasccordeiro/

How much could software errors cost your business?

Poor software quality cost US companies \$2.41 trillion in 2022, while the accumulated software Technical Debt (TD) has grown to ~\$1.52 trillion



TD relies on temporary easy-toimplement solutions to achieve shortterm results at the expense of efficiency in the long run

> The cost of poor software quality in the US: A 2022 Report



Objective of this talk

Discuss automated testing, verification, and repair techniques to establish a robust foundation for building secure software systems

- Introduce a logic-based automated reasoning platform to find and repair software vulnerabilities
- Explain testing, verification, and repair techniques to build secure software systems
- Present recent advancements towards a hybrid approach to protecting against memory safety and concurrency vulnerabilities


Research Questions

Given a program and a safety/security specification, can we automatically verify that the program performs as specified?

Can we leverage program analysis/synthesis to discover and fix more software vulnerabilities than existing state-of-the-art approaches?

ESBMC: An Automated Reasoning Platform

Logic-based automated reasoning for checking the safety and security of AI and software systems



The Bitter Lesson by Rich Sutton March 13, 2019


"The biggest lesson that can be read from 70 years of AI research is that general methods that leverage computation are ultimately the most effective, and by a large margin. The ultimate reason for this is Moore's law, or rather its generalization of continued exponentially falling cost per unit of computation"

"The two methods that seem to scale arbitrarily in this way are search and learning"

Agenda

- Towards Self-Healing Software via Large Language Models and Formal Verification
- Software Verification and Testing with the ESBMC framework
- Towards verification of C programs for CHERI platforms with ESBMC

Deep learning and Automated Program Repair




[1] Jin M, Shahriar S, Tufano M, Shi X, Lu S, Sundaresan N, Svyatkovskiy A. InferFix: End-to-End Program Repair with LLMs. arXiv e-prints. 2023 Mar:arXiv-2303.


[2] Li Y, Wang S, Nguyen TN. Dlfix: Context-based code transformation learning for automated program repair. InProceedings of the ACM/IEEE 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering 2020 Jun 27 (pp. 602-614).

[3] Gupta R, Pal S, Kanade A, Shevade S. Deepfix: Fixing common c language errors by deep learning. In Proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence 2017 Feb 12 (Vol. 31, No. 1).

Deep learning and Automated Program Repair




Large Language Models and Automated Program Repair




[4] Wang X, Wang Y, Wan Y, Mi F, Li Y, Zhou P, Liu J, Wu H, Jiang X, Liu Q. Compilable neural code generation with compiler feedback. arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.05132. 2022 Mar 10.

[5] Xia CS, Zhang L. Conversational automated program repair. arXiv preprint arXiv:2301.13246. 2023 Jan 30.

Large Language Models and Automated Program Repair




LLM + Formal Verification for Self-Healing Software




[6] Charalambous, Y., Tihanyi, N., Jain, R., Sun, Y., Ferrag, M. Cordeiro, L.: A New Era in Software Security: Towards Self-Healing Software via Large Language Models and Formal Verification. Under review at the ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, 2023.


LLM + Formal Verification for Self-Healing Software



LLM to Find Software Vulnerabilities



LLM + Formal Verification for Self-Healing Software



Experimental Evaluation

Set-up

Code Generation

- Processor: AMD Ryzen
 Threadripper PRO 3995WX
- Cores: 16
- RAM: 256 GB

Code Repair

- Model: MacBook Pro (2017)
- **RAM:** 16 GB RAM of LPDDR3 RAM (2133 MHz)
- Processor: 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7-7660U

Benchmarks

Generate 1000 programs with GPT-3.5 turbo with the following prompt.

Code generation prompt

Generate a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 50 lines of C code. Use at least two functions. Use strings, arrays, bit manipulations, and string manipulations inside the code. Be creative! Always include every necessary header. Only give me the code without any explanation. No comment in the code.


Objectives

To answer the following research questions.

RQ1: (Code generation) Are the state-of-the-art GPT models capable of producing compilable, semantically correct programs?


RQ2: (Code repair) Can external feedback improve the bug detection and patching ability of the GPT models?

Experimental Results



The FormAl Dataset: Generative Al in Software Security through the Lens of Formal Verification

 The first AI-generated repository consisting of 112k independent and compilable C programs



 It covers diverse programming tasks from network management and table games to string manipulation
 Tihanyi, N., Bisztray, T., Jain, R., Ferrag, M., Cordeiro, L., Mavroeid

Tihanyi, N., Bisztray, T., Jain, R., Ferrag, M., Cordeiro, L., Mavroeidis, V.: The FormAI Dataset: Generative AI in Software Security Through the Lens of Formal Verification. Accepted at ACM PROMISE, 2023

Comparison of Various Datasets Based on their Labeling Classifications

Dataset	Only C	Source	#Code Snips.	#Vuln. Snips.	Multi. Vulns/Snip.	Comp./ Gran.	Vuln. Label.	Avg. LOC	Label. Method
Big-Vul	×	Real-World	188,636	100%	×	X /Func.	CVE/CVW	30	PATCH
Draper	×	Syn.+Real-World	1,274,366	5.62%	~	≭ /Func.	CWE	29	STAT
SARD	×	Syn.+Real-World	100,883	100%	×	✔/Prog.	CWE	114	BDV+STAT+MAN
Juliet	×	Synthetic	106,075	100%	×	✔/Prog.	CWE	125	BDV
Devign	×	Real-World	27,544	46.05%	×	≭ /Func.	CVE	112	ML
REVEAL	×	Real-World	22,734	9.85%	×	≭ /Func.	CVE	32	PATCH
DiverseVul	×	Real-World	379,241	7.02%	×	≭ /Func.	CWE	44	PATCH
FormAI	~	AI-gen.	112,000	51.24%	~	✔/Prog.	CWE	79	ESBMC

Legend:

PATCH: GitHub Commits Patching a Vuln. Man: Manual Verification, Stat: Static Analyser, ML: Machine Learning Based, BDV: By design vulnerable

C Keyword Frequency and Associated CWEs

FormAl (Per Million LOC) SARD (Per Million LOC) BigVul (Per Million LOC)

	int -	101372	31966	29693	
	if -		34612	101101	
	char -	36826	31189	13025	
	return -	33599	6716	53284	
	for -	29002	3141	7807	
	void -	19734	36716	20895	z
	struct -	19052	3444	28113	orm
	else -	17178	5987	16550	aliz
	break -	15804	9528	14886	ed
	case -	12831	784	17404	Ave
	sizeof -	10488	10298	8912	rag
	while -	9845	1953	3274	e K
	double -	7297	517	1839	eyw
	float -	5733	271	753	ord
	unsigned -	3318	6862	9864	Fre
æ	typedef -	3066	379	64	que
Keywords	switch -	2488	771	2672	ncy
sbr	default -	2055	765	1999	He
	const -	1902	1358	20807	atn
	bool -	1640	0	5825	٦ap
	continue -	1562	0	2031	(Pe
	long -	1198	1763	4472	Ř
	do -	1057	1474	482	illio
	short -	273	2324	575	5
	enum -	219	0	460	nes
	static -	187	14078	10478	Normalized Average Keyword Frequency Heatmap (Per Million Lines of Code)
	goto -	34	474	10302	Cod
	union -	18	111	182	e)
	volatile -	14	2	155	
	signed -	2	0	47	
	register -	2	0	808	
	extern -	2	581	31	
	auto -	0	0	701	

#Vulns	Vuln.	Associated CWE-numbers
88,049	BOF	CWE-20, CWE-120, CWE-121, CWE-125, CWE- 129, CWE-131, CWE-628, CWE-676, CWE-680, CWE-754, CWE-787
31,829	\mathcal{DFN}	CWE-391, CWE-476, CWE-690
24,702	\mathcal{DFA}	CWE-119, CWE-125, CWE-129, CWE-131, CWE- 755, CWE-787
23,312	ARO	CWE-190, CWE-191, CWE-754, CWE-680, CWE- 681, CWE-682
11,088	ABV	CWE-119, CWE-125, CWE-129, CWE-131, CWE- 193, CWE-787, CWE-788
9823	\mathcal{DFI}	CWE-416, CWE-476, CWE-690, CWE-822, CWE- 824, CWE-825
5810	\mathcal{DFF}	CWE-401, CWE-404, CWE-459
1620	ΟΤΥ	CWE-119, CWE-125, CWE-158, CWE-362, CWE- 389, CWE-401, CWE-415, CWE-459, CWE-416, CWE-469, CWE-590, CWE-617, CWE-664, CWE- 662, CWE-685, CWE-704, CWE-761, CWE-787, CWE-823, CWE-825, CWE-843
1567	DBZ	CWE-369

- $\mathcal{ARO} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Arithmetic overflow
- $\mathcal{BOF} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Buffer overflow on scanf()/fscanf()
- $\mathcal{ABV} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Array bounds violated
- $\mathcal{DFN} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Dereference failure : NULL pointer
- $\mathcal{DFF} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Dereference failure : forgotten memory
- $\mathcal{DFI} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Dereference failure : invalid pointer
- $\mathcal{DFA} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Dereference failure : array bounds violated
- $\mathcal{DBZ} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Division by zero
- $\mathcal{OTV} \subseteq \mathcal{VF}$: Other vulnerabilities

0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000

The FormAl Dataset: Generative Al in Software Security through the Lens of Formal Verification

FORMAI DATASET: A LARGE COLLECTION OF AI-GENERATED C PROGRAMS AND THEIR VULNERABILITY CLASSIFICATIONS



Citation Author(s): Norbert Tihanyi (D) (Technology Innovation Institute) Tamas Bisztray (D) (University of Oslo) Ridhi Jain (D) (Technology Innovation Institute) Mohamed Amine Ferrag (D) (Technology Innovation Institute) Lucas C. Cordeiro 🝺 (University of Manchester) Vasileios Mavroeidis (D) (University of Oslo) Submitted by: Norbert Tihanyi Last updated: Mon, 06/19/2023 - 15:07 10.21227/vp9n-wv96

*.csv (zip);

ၜြာ 165 Views	
Categories:	Artificial Intelligence Security
Keywords:	artificial intelligence, Software Vulnerability Dataset


WARNING: BE CAREFUL WHEN RUNNING THE COMPILED PROGRAMS, SOME CAN CONNECT TO THE WEB. SCAN YOUR LOCAL NETWORK. OR DELETE A RANDOM FILE FROM YOUR FILE SYSTEM. ALWAYS CHECK THE SOURCE CODE AND THE COMMENTS IN THE FILE BEFORE **RUNNING IT!!!**

https://github.com/FormAI-Dataset

DATASET FILES

- FormAI dataset: Vulnerability Classification (No C source code included) FormAI dataset human readable-V1.csv (15.95 MB)
- FormAI dataset: 112000 compilable AI-generated C code FormAI dataset C samples-V1.zip (97.61 MB)

• FormAI dataset: Vulnerability Classification (C source code included in CSV) FormAl_dataset_classification-V1.zip (60.66 MB)



SecureFalcon: The Next Cyber Reasoning System for Cyber Security

Mohamed Amine Ferrag^{*}, Ammar Battah^{*}, Norbert Tihanyi^{*}, Merouane Debbah[†], Thierry Lestable^{*}, and Lucas C. Cordeiro[‡] *Technology Innovation Institute, 9639 Masdar City, Abu Dhabi, UAE *Email: firstname.lastname@tii.ae [†]Khalifa University of Science and Technology, P O Box 127788, Abu Dhabi, UAE [†]Email: merouane.debbah@ku.ac.ae [‡]University of Manchester, Manchester, UK [‡]Email: lucas.cordeiro@manchester.ac.uk

TABLE VII: Classification report of *SecureFalcon* 121M with LR = 2e-5.

Precision	Recall	F1-Score	Support
0.89	0.84	0.86	4528
0.95	0.97	0.96	15533
	0	.94	
0.92	0.90	0.91	20061
0.94	0.94	0.94	20061
	0.89 0.95 0.92	0.89 0.95 0.97 0 0.92 0.90	0.89 0.84 0.86 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.91

TABLE VIII: Classification report of *SecureFalcon* 121M with LR = 2e-2.

	Precision	Recall	F1-Score	Support
0	0.67	0.80	0.73	4528
1	0.94	0.88	0.91	15533
Accuracy		0	.87	
Macro avg	0.80	0.84	0.82	20061
Weighted avg	0.88	0.87	0.87	20061


Vulnrebality detected by SecureFalcon model

```
The following C code is vulnerable to a buffer overflow vulnerability.
Please repair it.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
void secretFunction() {
    printf("Congratulations!\n");
void vulnerableFunction(char* str) {
    char buffer[30];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
    if(argc != 2) {
        printf("Please supply one argument.\n");
        return 1;
    vulnerableFunction(argv[1]);
    printf("Executed normally.\n");
    return 0;
```


Agenda

- Towards Self-Healing Software via Large Language Models and Formal Verification
- Software Verification and Testing with the ESBMC framework
- Towards verification of C programs for CHERI platforms with ESBMC

SAT solving as enabling technology




SAT Competition




number of solved instances


http://www.satcompetition.org/

Bounded Model Checking (BMC)





- program modelled as transition system
 - state: pc and program variables
 - derived from control-flow graph







- program modelled as transition system
 - state: pc and program variables
 - derived from control-flow graph
 - added safety properties as extra nodes





- program modelled as transition system
 - state: pc and program variables
 - derived from control-flow graph
 - added safety properties as extra nodes
- program unfolded up to given bounds






- program modelled as transition system
 - state: pc and program variables
 - derived from control-flow graph
 - added safety properties as extra nodes
- program unfolded up to given bounds
- unfolded program optimized to reduce blow-up

- constant propagation/slicing
- forward substitutions/caching
- unreachable code/pointer analysis

```
int getPassword() {
    char buf[2];
    gets(buf);
    return strcmp(buf, "ML");
  }

void main(){
    int x=getPassword();
    if(x){
      printf("Access Denied\n");
      exit(0);
    }
    printf("Access Granted\n");
}
```



- program modelled as transition system
 - state: pc and program variables
 - derived from control-flow graph
 - added safety properties as extra nodes
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- unfolded program optimized to reduce blow-up

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- front-end converts unrolled and optimized program into SSA

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int getPassword() {
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
$$\begin{array}{l} g_1 = x_1 == 0 \\ a_1 = a_0 \text{ WITH } [i_0:=0] \\ a_2 = a_0 \\ a_3 = a_2 \text{ WITH } [2+i_0:=1] \\ a_4 = g_1 ? a_1 : a_3 \\ t_1 = a_4 [1+i_0] == 1 \end{array}$$

- program modelled as transition system
 - *state*: *pc* and program variables
 - derived from control-flow graph
 - added safety properties as extra nodes
- program unfolded up to given bounds
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
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


- program modelled as transition system
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- constant propagation/slicing
- forward substitutions/caching
- unreachable code/pointer analysis
- front-end converts unrolled and optimized program into SSA
- extraction of constraints C and properties P
 - specific to selected SMT solver, uses theories
- satisfiability check of $C \land \neg P$

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    printf("Access Granted\n");
}
```



Induction-Based Verification for Software

k-induction checks loop-free programs...

- base case (base_k): find a counter-example with up to k loop unwindings (plain BMC)
- forward condition (*fwd_k*): check that P holds in all states reachable within k unwindings
- inductive step (step_k): check that whenever P holds for k unwindings, it also holds after next unwinding
 - havoc variables
 - assume loop condition
 - run loop body (k times)
 - assume loop termination
- \Rightarrow iterative deepening if inconclusive

Gadelha, M., Ismail, H., Cordeiro, L.: Handling loops in bounded model checking of C programs via k-induction. Int. J. Softw. Tools Technol. Transf. 19(1): 97-114 (2017)

Induction-Based Verification for Software

k=1while *k*<=*max* iterations **do** if base_{P, \u03c6, k} then **return** *trace s*[0..*k*] else k=k+1if *fwd*_{P, \u03c6, k} then return true else if step_{P', o,k} then return true end if end return unknown

unsigned int x=*; while(x>0) x--; assume(x<=0); assert(x==0);

unsigned int x=*; while(x>0) x--; assert(x<=0); assert(x==0);

unsigned int x=*; assume(x>0); while(x>0) x--; assume(x<=0); assert(x==0);

Automatic Invariant Generation

_n ()

(a <= 100)

t(a>10):

0:

- Infer invariants based on intervals as abstract domain via a dependence graph
 - $E.g., a \le x \le b$ (integer and floating-point)
 - Inject intervals as assumptions and contract them via CSP
 - Remove unreachable states

Line	Interval for "a"	Restriction
4	$(-\infty, +\infty)$	None
6	(−∞, 100]	<i>a</i> ≤ 100
7	(100, +∞)	<i>a</i> > 100


k-Induction proof rule "hijacks" loop conditions to nondeterministic values, thus computing intervals become essential

k-Induction can prove the correctness of more programs when the invariant generation is enabled

Gadelha, M., Monteiro, F., Cordeiro, L., Nicole, D.: ESBMC v6.0: Verifying C Programs Using k-Induction and Invariant Inference - (Competition Contribution). TACAS (3) 2019: 209-213

BMC of Software Using Interval Methods via Contractors


- 1) Analyze intervals and properties
 - Static Analysis / Abstract
 Interpretation
- 2) Convert the problem into a CSP
 - Variables, Domains and Constraints
- 3) Apply contractor to CSP
 - Forward-Backward Contractor
- 4) Apply reduced intervals back to the program



This **assumption** prunes our search space to the **orange area**

<pre>unsigned int x=nondet_uint();</pre>
<pre>2 unsigned int y=nondet_uint();</pre>
3ESBMC_assume(x >= 20 && x <= 30);
4ESBMC_assume(y <= 30);
$5 \text{ assert}(x \ge y);$


Domain: [x] = [20, 30] and [y] = [0, 30]Constraint: $y - x \le 0$



f(x) > 0	$I = [0, \infty)$	
f(x) = y - x	$[f(x)_1] = I \cap [y_0] - [x_0]$	Forward-step
x = y - f(x)	$[x_1] = [x_0] \cap [y_0] - [f(x)_1]$	Backward-step
y = f(x) + x	$[y_1] = [y_0] \cap [f(x)_1] + [x_1]$	Backward-step


Intl. Software Verification Competition (SV-Comp 2023)

- SV-COMP 2023, 23805 verification tasks, max. score: 38644
- ESBMC solved most verification tasks in \leq 10 seconds




White-box Fuzzing: Bug Finding and Code Coverage

- Translate the program to an intermediate representation (IR)
- Add properties to check errors or goals to check coverage
- **Symbolically** execute IR to produce an SSA program
- Translate the resulting SSA program into a **logical formula**
- Solve the formula iteratively to cover errors and goals
- Interpret the solution to figure out the **input conditions**
- Spit those input conditions out as a test case



FuSeBMC v4 Framework

- Use Clang tooling infrastructure
- Employ three engines in its reachability analysis: one BMC and two fuzzing engines
- Use a **tracer** to coordinate the various engines




Alshmrany, K., Aldughaim, M., Bhayat, A., Cordeiro, L.: FuSeBMC v4: Smart Seed Generation for Hybrid Fuzzing - (Competition Contribution). FASE 2022: 336-340

Interval Analysis and Methods for Automated Test Case Generation


This combined method can reduce CPU time, memory usage, and energy consumption

We advocate that combining cooperative verification and constraint programming is essential to leverage a modular cooperative cloud-native testing platform



Aldughaim, M., Alshmrany, K., Gadelha, M., de Freitas, R., Cordeiro, L.: FuSeBMC_IA: Interval Analysis and Methods for Test Case Generation - (Competition Contribution). FASE 2023: 324-329

Competition on Software Testing 2023: Results of the Overall Category




FuSeBMC achieved 3 awards: 1st place in Cover-Error, 1st place in Cover-Branches, and 1st place in Overall

Alshmrany, K., Aldughaim, M., Bhayat, A., Cordeiro, L.: FuSeBMC v4: Smart Seed Generation for Hybrid Fuzzing - (Competition Contribution). FASE 2022: 336-340

https://test-comp.sosy-lab.org/2023/

EBF: Black-Box Cooperative Verification for Concurrent Programs



Aljaafari, F., Shmarov, F., Manino, E., Menezes, R., Cordeiro, L.: EBF 4.2: Black-Box Cooperative Verification for Concurrent Programs - (Competition Contribution). TACAS (2) 2023: 541-546

EBF 4.0 with different BMC tools

- BMC 6 min + OpenGBF 5 min + results Aggregation 4 min = 15 min
- RAM limit is 15 GB per Benchexec run
- ConcurrencySafety main from SV-COMP 2022
 - Witness validation switched off
- Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS with 160 GB RAM and 25 cores

Verification	Tool							
outcome	EBF	Deagle	EBF	Cseq	EBF	ESBMC	EBF	CBMC
Correct True	240	240	172	177	65	70	139	146
Correct False	336	319	333	313	308	268	320	303
Incorrect True	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incorrect False	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Unknown	187	204	258	273	390	424	304	311

- EBF4.0 increases the number of detected bugs for BMC tools
- EBF4.0 provides a better trade-off between bug finding and safety proving than each BMC engine

WolfMQTT Verification


 wolfMQTT library is a client implementation of the MQTT protocol written in C for IoT devices

subscribe_task
and waitMessage_task are
called through different threads
 accessing packet_ret,
 causing a data race in
 MqttClient WaitType

Here is where the data race might happen! Unprotected pointer

```
Int main() {
Pthread t th1, th2;
static MQTTCtx mqttCtx;
pthread create(&th1, subscribe task, &mqttCtx))
pthread create(&th2, waitMessage task, &mqttCtx))}
static void *subscribe task(void *client){
MqttClient WaitType(client, msg, MQTT PACKET TYPE ANY,
0,timeout ms);
. . . . . }
static void *waitMessage task(void *client) {
MqttClient WaitType(client, msg, MQTT PACKET TYPE ANY,
0,timeout ms);
static int MqttClient WaitType(MqttClient *client,
void *packet obj,
   byte wait type, word16 wait packet id, int timeout ms)
           rc = wm SemLock(&client->lockClient);
           if (rc == 0) {
               if (MqttClient RespList Find(client,
(MqttPacketType) wait type,
                       wait packet id, &pendResp)) {
                   if (pendResp->packetDone)
                       rc = pendResp->packet ret;
. . . . . }
```

WolfMQTT Verification



MQTT Client

Bug Report

embhorn merged 1 commit into wolfSSL:master from dgarske:mt_suback [므 on 3 Jun 2021
Inversation 2 -O- Commits 1 F. Checks 0 E Files changed	4 +74 -48
dgarske commented on 2 Jun 2021	Contributor 😳 ··· Reviewers
1. The client lock is needed earlier to protect the "reset the packet state".	🚺 lygstate
 The subscribe ack was using an unprotected pointer to response code list. Nov 	w it makes a copy of those codes.
3. Add protection to multi-thread example "stop" variable.	
Thanks to Fatimah Aljaafari (@fatimahkj) for the report.	Assignees
ZD 12379 and PR 🕑 Data race at function MqttClient_WaitType #198	() embhorn
🕘 Fixes for three multi-thread issues: 🚥	× 78370ed Labels
	None yet
dgarske requested a review from embhorn 15 months ago	1.0000.00 × 3.000
	Projects
A Garske assigned embhorn on 2 Jun 2021	None yet
	Milestone
embhorn approved these changes on 3 Jun 2021	View changes No milestone

https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfMQTT



Agenda

- Towards Self-Healing Software via Large Language Models and Formal Verification
- Software Verification and Testing with the ESBMC framework
- Towards verification of C programs for CHERI platforms with ESBMC

Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI)

6	53			0	
	permissions (15 bits)	reserved	base and bounds (41 bits)		
	pointer address (64 bits)				

CHERI 128-bit capability

CHERI Clang/LLVM and **LLD¹** - compiler and linker for CHERI ISAs

¹https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/cheri-llvm.html

CheriBSD² - adaptation of FreeBSD to support CHERI ISAs

²https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/cheribsd.html


ARM Morello³ - SoC development board with a CHERI-extended ARMv8-A processor

³https://www.arm.com/architecture/cpu/morello

Mnemonic	Description
CGetBase	Move base to a GPR
CGetLen	Move length to a GPR
CGetTag	Move tag bit to a GPR
CGetPerm	Move permissions to a GPR
CGetPCC	Move the PCC and PC to GPRs
CIncBase	Increase base and decrease length
CSetLen	Set (reduce) length
CClearTag	Invalidate a capability register
CAndPerm	Restrict permissions
CToPtr	Generate C0-based integer pointer from
	a capability
CFromPtr	CIncBase with support for NULL casts
CBTU	Branch if capability tag is unset
CBTS	Branch if capability tag is set




CHERI-C program



/* models arbitrary user input */


/* fails: not the same object */ /* more CHERI-C API checks */ /* setting memory through a capability */

Pure-capability CHERI-C model




All pointers are automatically replaced with capabilities by the CHERI Clang/LLVM compiler

ESBMC-CHERI




Brauße et al.: ESBMC-CHERI: towards verification of C programs for CHERI platforms with ESBMC. ISSTA 2022: 773-776

Hybrid Verification Framework Vision



- Accentuate post-deployment safety
 - Reduce performance overheads by using "cheaper" hardware level protection
 - Reuse the information from static analysis to ensure only necessary more "expensive" safety checks are introduced
- Enhance pre-deployment analysis
 - Combine complementary techniques
 - Avoid producing a monolithic hybrid solution (e.g., concolic execution)

Research Mission: Automated Reasoning System for Safe & Secure SW and AI



Impact: Awards and Industrial Deployment

- Distinguished Paper Award at ICSE'11
- Best Paper Award at SBESC'15
- Most Influential Paper Award at ASE'23
- **39 awards** from the international competitions on software verification (SV-COMP) and testing (Test-Comp) 2012-2023 at **TACAS/FASE**
 - Bug Finding and Code Coverage
- Intel deploys ESBMC in production as one of its verification engines for verifying firmware in C
- Nokia and ARM have found security vulnerabilities in software written in C/C++
- Funded by EPSRC, Intel, Motorola, Samsung, Nokia, CNPq, FAPEAM, British Council, and Royal Society