

# Introduction to Software Security

## Coursework 01

### Introduction

This coursework introduces students to basic approaches to specify and verify security aspects concerning *confidentiality*, *integrity* and *availability* for software systems. In particular, this coursework provides theoretical and practical exercises to (i) identify and describe software vulnerabilities concerning memory safety in C programs; (ii) describe and evaluate typical examples of SQL injection, which can be exploited by an attacker; (iii) specify and verify race conditions in concurrent software; (iv) identify and describe cyber-threats in a simple embedded system, which can be remotely operated; and lastly (v) describe how (bounded) model checking techniques work.

### Learning Objectives

By the end of this lab you will be able to:

- Define standard notions of security and use them to evaluate the system's confidentiality, integrity and availability.
- Explain standard software security problems in real-world applications.
- Use testing and verification techniques to reason about the system's safety and security.

1) **(Critical Software Vulnerabilities)** Identify and describe the critical software vulnerabilities from the program statements a) to e) considering the following C code.

```
int *zPtr;
int *aPtr = NULL;
void *sPtr = NULL;
int number, i;
int z[5] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
sPtr = z;
```

- a) ++zPtr;
- b) number = zPtr;
- c) number = \*zPtr[2];
- d) number = \*sPtr;
- e) ++z;

2) **(SQL injection)** SQL injection allows an attacker to interfere with the queries to the database in order to retrieve data. For example, a programmer can construct a SQL query to check name and password as

```
query = "select * from users where
name=' " + name + "' and pw = ' " +
password + "'"
```

**Figure 2:** SQL Injection Example.

If an attacker provides the name string, the attacker can set name to “John’ --”; this would remove the password check from the query (note that -- starts a comment in SQL). Provide here other examples of SQL injection:

- i. Retrieving hidden data;
- ii. Subverting application logic;
- iii. UNION attacks;
- iv. Examining the database;
- v. Blind SQL injection.

3) **(Race Condition)** Specify the three properties described below for the following mutual exclusion algorithm using linear-time temporal logic (LTL).

**int** flag[2], turn, x, i;

<pre><b>void</b> *t1(<b>void</b> *arg) {   flag[0] = 1;   turn = 1;   <b>while</b> (flag[1] == 1 &amp;&amp; turn == 1) {};   //critical section   <b>if</b> (i==1) x=1;   //end of critical section   flag[0] = 0;   <b>return</b> NULL; }</pre>	<pre><b>void</b> *t2(<b>void</b> *arg) {   flag[1] = 1;   turn = 0;   <b>while</b> (flag[0] == 1 &amp;&amp; turn == 0) {};   //critical section   <b>if</b> (i==2) x=2;   //end of critical section   flag[1] = 0;   <b>return</b> NULL; }</pre>
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- i. At most, one process in the critical region at any time.
- ii. Whenever a process tries to enter its critical region, it will eventually succeed.
- iii. A process can eventually ask to enter its critical region.

4) **(Cyber-threats)** A typical embedded system consists of *human-machine interface* (keyboard and display), *processing unit* (real-time computer system), and *instrumentation interface* (sensor, network, and actuator) that can be connected to some physical plant. Figure 1 illustrates a simple embedded system employed in a chemical process, which can be operated remotely via TCP/IP protocol. In particular, the overall objective of this simple embedded system is to keep the temperature and pressure of some chemical process within well-defined limits by a remote operator.




Figure 1: Simple Embedded System [1].

- i. Specify the following properties of this simple embedded system using LTL:
  - a) A **T** process reads the measured values from a temperature sensor and turns the heating system on if the temperature is below 20°C and turns off the heating system if the temperature is above 300°C.
  - b) Process **P** regulates pressure with a sensor opening the pump/valve when the pressure value is above 500bar and closing the pump/valve when the pressure value is below 100bar.
  - c) Whenever the **T** and **P** processes transfer data to an **S** process, the measured values will be shown on a liquid crystal display (LCD).
- ii. What are the **security objectives** of this simple embedded system?
- iii. What are the sources of **security problems** that can arise when operating this simple embedded system remotely?

5) (**Bounded Model Checking**) Describe the main steps involved in checking programs using the BMC technique, from reading the program to generating the SMT formulas [2]. Consider the following example to describe each step in the technique. The **assume** directive can define constraints over (non-deterministic) variables, and the **assert** directive is used to check system's correctness w.r.t. a given property.

```
#include <assert.h>
#define a 2
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    long long int i=1, sn=0;
    unsigned int n=5;
    assume (n>=1);
    while (i<=n) {
        sn = sn + a;
    }
}
```

```

    i++;
}
assert (sn==n*a);
}

```

### Marking Scheme

Note that this may be refined to introduce extra cases reflecting special cases if required.

#### Question 1) Has the student Identified and described the critical software vulnerabilities for all program statements?

The student was able to identify and describe the vulnerabilities according to the CIA principle.	(2)
The student was able to identify the vulnerabilities but he/she is unable to describe those vulnerabilities considering the CIA principle.	(1)
No attempt has been made.	(0)

#### Question 2) Is the student able to provide all examples of SQL injection as requested in the question?

The student can provide all examples of SQL injections.	(2)
The student can provide four examples of SQL injections.	(1.5)
The student can provide two or three examples of SQL injections.	(1.0)
The student can provide one example of SQL injections.	(0.5)
No attempt has been made.	(0)

#### Question 3) Is the student able to specify the three LTL properties for the following mutual exclusion algorithm?

The student can specify all three LTL properties.	(2)
The student can specify two LTL properties.	(1.5)
The student can specify one LTL property.	(1.0)
No attempt has been made.	(0)

#### Question 4) Is the student able to specify the LTL properties, security objective and problems?

The student can specify all three LTL properties together with the security objective and problems.	(2)
The student can specify all three LTL properties together with the security objective.	(1.5)
The student can specify all three LTL properties together with the security problems.	(1.5)
The student can specify the security objective and problems only.	(1.0)
The student can specify all three LTL properties only.	(1.0)
The student can specify the security objective only.	(0.5)
The student can specify the security problems only.	(0.5)
The student can specify less than three LTL properties only.	(0.5)
No attempt has been made.	(0)

<b>Question 5) Is the student able to explain the BMC technique using the illustrative example?</b>	
The student can explain all the steps of the BMC technique using the illustrative example.	(2)
The student can explain only parts of the BMC technique.	(1)
No attempt has been made.	(0)

## References

- [1] Alan Burns, Andrew J. Wellings: *Real-Time Systems and Programming Languages - Ada, Real-Time Java and C / Real-Time POSIX*, Fourth Edition. International computer science series, Addison-Wesley 2009, ISBN 978-0-321-41745-9, pp. I-XVIII, 1-602.
- [2] Lucas C. Cordeiro, Bernd Fischer, João Marques-Silva: *SMT-Based Bounded Model Checking for Embedded ANSI-C Software*. IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 38(4): 957-974 (2012)